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In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,1 
the Supreme Court held that on the facts there presented, the  
Free Exercise Clause protected a wedding-cake baker who 
conscientiously objected to making a cake for a same-sex wedding. 
The decision has been widely described as a very narrow ruling  
on odd facts.2 My central claim in this Article is that the opinion has 
much broader implications than have been recognized. 
 
*   Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law and Professor of Religious Studies, 
University of Virginia, and Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University 
of Texas. This Article is based on the First Annual Religious Liberty Lecture at Brigham 
Young University Law School, on September 12, 2018. Portions of this Article draw from an 
amicus brief and blog posts co-authored with Professor Thomas C. Berg. All websites were 
last visited on June 9, 2019. Perma links have been provided where possible. 
 1. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
 2. See, e.g., KAREN MOULDING & NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL 
RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 11:1 (Oct. 2018 Update) (“the 
decision on extraordinarily narrow grounds actually proved, at least in the immediate 
debate, to be a dud”); Rodney W. Harrell, State Religious Free-Exercise Defenses to 
Nondiscrimination Laws: Still Relevant After Masterpiece Cakeshop, 87 UMKC L. REV. 297, 314 
(2019) (“the Court resolved this case narrowly on facts that are not likely to be repeated”); 
Adam Liptak, In Narrow Decision, Supreme Court Sides with Baker Who Turned Away Gay 
Couple, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/04/us/politics 
/supreme-court-sides-with-baker-who-turned-away-gay-couple.html [https://perma.cc/K 
WV6-Z6Z3]; Eugene Volokh, The Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Leaves Almost All the Big 
Questions Unresolved, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 4, 2018, 10:49 AM), 
https://reason.com/volokh/2018/06/04/the-masterpiece-cakeshop-decision-leaves 
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I do not mean merely that a narrow judicial statement of a new 
right may evolve over time into a much broader right, although that 
is certainly true.3 And I do not mean merely that Justice Kavanaugh 
is likely to be more sympathetic to the free exercise of religion, and 
less sympathetic to gay rights, than Justice Kennedy would have 
been, although that is probably also true. I mean that the Masterpiece 
opinion, as written, combined with a bit of savvy lawyering on the 
part of those representing conscientious objectors, logically leads to 
a general protection for conscientious objectors, at least in 
religiously important contexts such as weddings. 
Since same-sex marriage first became a prominent public issue 
in 2004, I have advocated for marriage equality with religious 
exemptions—full legal equality for same-sex marriages, with 
exemptions that protect non-profit religious organizations from 
having to celebrate or recognize those marriages, and with religious 
exemptions for very small for-profit businesses from having to 
assist with the wedding or its celebration so long as other providers 
of the same goods or services are readily available.4 I have never 
doubted that the conscientious objectors who claim this exemption 
are discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but I have 
argued that they should have an affirmative defense to protect the 
free exercise of religion. The solution to this conflict is to protect the 
rights of each side—the right of both same-sex couples and 
conscientious objectors to live their own lives by their own deepest 
values and in accord with their deeply felt identity. As has been 
explained elsewhere, sexual minorities and religious minorities 
make fundamentally similar claims on the larger society.5 
 
[https://perma.cc/ZB43-VSF8]; Amy Howe, ScotusBlog, Opinion Analysis: Court Rules 
(Narrowly) for Baker in Same-Sex-Wedding-Cake Case [Updated], (June 4, 2018, 4:07 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/opinion-analysis-court-rules-narrowly-for-baker 
-in-same-sex-wedding-cake-case/ [https://perma.cc/VWE6-RBFR]. 
 3. Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017–2018 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139.  
 4. This advocacy appears in articles, briefs, and letters to legislators and other policy 
makers. These materials are collected in DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME 
THREE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACTS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LEGISLATION, AND THE 
CULTURE WARS 763–976 (2018), and DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME FOUR: 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION AFTER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT, WITH MORE ON THE 
CULTURE WARS 695–863 (2018). 
 5. Douglas Laycock, Liberty and Justice for All, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND 
THE PROSPECTS FOR COMMON GROUND 24, 26–27 (William Eskridge & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds. 
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Government should not interfere with sexual orientation, and it 
should not interfere with the exercise of religion, without the most 
compelling reasons. 
The Masterpiece opinion does not go so far, but it is consistent 
with this view. The Court set the right tone, insisting on the need to 
respect the rights and dignity of both sides. “[G]ay persons and gay 
couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity 
and worth. . . . The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to 
others must be given great weight and respect by the courts.”6 “At 
the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay 
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected 
forms of expression. . . . [T]he Commission was obliged under the 
Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and 
tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.”7 
The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado Court 
of Appeals had failed to treat the baker’s religious commitments 
with either neutrality or respect, and their obvious bias violated  
the Free Exercise Clause.8 This bias was manifested in hostile 
comments and in unequal treatment of customers and bakers on 
opposite sides of the moral debate over same-sex marriage. Savvy 
officials can suppress their hostile comments. But savvy 
conscientious objectors can smoke out unequal treatment by 
sending testers to request goods and services that retailers  
who support same-sex marriage are likely to refuse. A state that 
protects these liberal retailers while penalizing religious 
conscientious objectors violates the Free Exercise Clause under 
Masterpiece, and on reasonable readings of the Court’s recent  
free-exercise precedents. 
 
2018); Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: 
Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 
2411, 2416–30 (1997). 
 6. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. 
 7. Id. at 1727, 1731. 
 8. Id. at 1729–32. 
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I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Deeper analysis of Masterpiece has to begin in 1990, with 
Employment Division v. Smith.9 Smith changed the law of free 
exercise in important ways, but 29 years later, the meaning of that 
change remains unsettled. Mr. Smith consumed peyote at a 
worship service of the Native American Church,10 where the central 
ritual is the supervised consumption of peyote in a highly 
structured ceremony.11 
Hallucinogenic drugs have been used for religious purposes 
throughout human history and all around the world.12 Peyote is a 
naturally occurring hallucinogen. One consumes peyote by eating 
the bud of a cactus plant; it is tough and hard to chew, and it often 
causes nausea or vomiting.13 So there has never been a significant 
recreational market for peyote. But American Indians were  
using it for religious purposes when the earliest Spanish explorers 
arrived, and probably for millennia before that, and they still are.14 
The Native American Church teaches total avoidance of all other 
drugs, including alcohol, and is generally viewed as a positive  
influence in the lives of its members.15 Religious use of peyote  
by the Native American Church has long been exempt from the 
federal drug laws,16 and after the Court’s decision, Congress 
extended the protection to all American Indians and preempted 
contrary state law.17 
Smith was fired when his supervisor learned that he had 
attended the peyote service. He did not sue over his discharge, but 
 
 9. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 10. Id. at 874. 
 11. Robert L. Bergman, Navajo Peyote Use: Its Apparent Safety, 128 AM. J. PSYCH. 695, 
695–96 (1971). 
 12. See Brief of the Council on Spiritual Practices, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents 4–10, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 2237542 (collecting scholarly sources). 
 13. EDWARD F. ANDERSON, PEYOTE: THE DIVINE CACTUS 83, 187 (2d ed. 1996); James S. 
Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND 
PHILOSOPHY 96, 98 (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock eds. 1956). 
 14. OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 17 (1987). 
 15. Bergman, supra note 11, at 698. 
 16. Listing of Additional Drugs Subject to Control; Temporary Exemption From 
Record-Keeping Requirements, 31 FED. REG. 4679 (Mar. 19, 1966), now codified as 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1307.31 (2018). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2012). 
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he did apply for unemployment compensation. The Supreme Court 
had repeatedly held that workers were entitled to unemployment 
compensation when they lost their jobs for religious reasons—for 
refusing to work on the Sabbath most commonly,18 or for refusing 
to make weapons.19 
The relevant legal rule came from two leading cases, Sherbert v. 
Verner20 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.21 Sherbert and Yoder held that 
government may not burden a religious practice unless that burden 
is necessary to serve a compelling government interest.22 So, for 
example, government could refuse to exempt people who 
conscientiously objected to paying taxes.23 But there was no such 
compelling interest in withholding unemployment compensation 
from workers with religious practices that conflicted with their 
employers’ demands,24 or even in an extra year or two of formal 
education for Amish children.25 
In Smith, the state claimed a compelling interest in a no-
exceptions drug-enforcement policy. Smith replied that the tightly 
controlled religious use of peyote was not dangerous, so that the 
state’s interest was nowhere near compelling. That is how the case 
was argued, but that is not how the Court decided it. 
Instead, and without being asked, Justice Scalia said the state 
didn’t have to show a compelling interest at all. If the law was 
neutral and generally applicable—a phrase he never defined—it 
could be applied even to the central ritual of a worship service.26 
The opinion appears to say that if the law is neutral and generally 
 
 18. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 19. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 21. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 22. Id. at 215 (“only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 
(“any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a 
‘compelling state interest’”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)); id. at 406 
(“only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible 
limitation”) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)). 
 23. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982). 
 24. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835 (1989); Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718–19; 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–09. 
 25. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221–29. 
 26. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–89 (1990). 
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applicable, the state doesn’t have to have any reason at all for 
refusing religious exemptions.27 It can just say no. Smith was 5-4, 
the work of four conservatives (Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and White) plus Justice Stevens. 
The rhetorical tone of the opinion was hostile to religious 
exemptions. Lower courts responded to the rhetoric and initially 
said that pretty much every law was neutral and generally 
applicable—even a zoning law that categorically excluded 
churches.28 The city had a reason for excluding churches that was 
more than just hostility to churches, so according to the Eighth 
Circuit, the law was neutral and generally applicable.29 
But Sherbert and Yoder were not overruled. Scalia had only five 
votes, and it’s a reasonable inference that one of those five said he 
wouldn’t vote to overrule anything. So Sherbert and Yoder were 
distinguished and given new explanations. 
Yoder had held that Wisconsin could not require the Amish to 
send their children to high school. Scalia claimed that Yoder was 
based on a hybrid of free exercise and the parents’ right to control 
their children’s education.30 This hybrid-rights theory seemed to 
contemplate that if you combined a failed parental-rights claim 
with a failed free-exercise claim, the two failed claims would 
somehow add up to a successful hybrid claim. That never made any 
sense, and almost nothing has come of the hybrid-rights theory.31 It 
 
 27. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability 
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 630 (2003) (“laws 
that are neutral and generally applicable require no justification, no matter how  
seriously they burden the religious claimant, or how trivial the government interest is in  
their execution”).  
 28. The zoning ordinance listed a number of specific uses in commercial zones but did 
not list churches. Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 466 n.1 (8th Cir. 
1991) (setting out the ordinance). The city “unequivocally interpreted” this listing to 
categorically exclude churches. Id. at 468 n.2. The City Council subsequently passed a 
resolution making even more explicit its view that churches were excluded. Id. at 467. 
 29. Id. at 472. See also Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 777–78 & nn.188–89 (1998) (noting other examples). 
 30. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82. 
 31. See Combs v. Homer-Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting hybrid 
parental-rights and free-exercise claim, and reviewing earlier decisions rejecting or 
minimizing the exception); Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The 
Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception”, 108 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 573, 587–605 (2003) (attempting to defend the exception, but reviewing the many cases 
refusing to apply it or interpreting it in ways that make it meaningless); Lund, supra note 27, 
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is notable principally for Scalia’s choice to rely on an unenumerated 
right—a category of rights that he always said he didn’t believe 
in32—rather than the textually explicit Free Exercise Clause. 
The more important reinterpretation was what Scalia said 
about Sherbert v. Verner, the first of the unemployment-
compensation cases. He said that the law in Sherbert was not neutral 
and generally applicable, because the state accepted “at least some” 
reasons for refusing available work.33 You don’t forfeit 
unemployment compensation if you decline a job far beneath your 
skill level, or two hundred miles from your home. You don’t have 
to work in a strip club or a massage parlor. There weren’t many 
acceptable reasons for refusing work and demanding a government 
check instead, but there were “at least some.” Because the  
state accepted some secular reasons for refusing work, it had to also 
accept religious reasons. Mrs. Sherbert was still constitutionally 
entitled to her unemployment compensation, even after Smith. But 
Smith was not, because the Court treated the case as a  
challenge to Oregon’s drug laws rather than as a challenge to its 
unemployment compensation laws. In an earlier decision in the 
same case, the Court had reasoned that if Oregon could imprison 
Smith for religious use of peyote, surely it could withhold  
unemployment compensation.34 
The implications of the Court’s explanation of Sherbert v. Verner 
were initially subordinated to the opinion’s hostile rhetoric about 
exemptions. But think about it. If a law with even a few secular 
exceptions isn’t neutral and generally applicable, then not many 
laws are. Exceptions grease the wheels for legislation; legislators 
often exempt their friends and contributors, and they exempt 
interest groups that might be strong enough to block passage of the 
bill. There were no exceptions in the law banning peyote,35 but such 
 
at 630–32 (collecting opinions and articles dismissing the exception, including a Justice Scalia 
opinion that is plainly inconsistent with any version of the hybrid-rights exception). 
 32. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that parental rights are not judicially enforceable because the Constitution does not  
mention them). 
 33. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
 34. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988). 
 35. The Oregon drug laws had a medical exception, but the state told the Court that 
that exception did not apply to peyote because it was a Schedule I drug. Brief for Petitioners 
13–14 & n.6, Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846. 
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across-the-board total prohibitions are fairly unusual. If a law that 
burdens religion is not neutral, or not generally applicable, it still 
has to be justified by a compelling government interest.36 And 
Smith’s discussion of Sherbert implies that not many laws are 
neutral and generally applicable. 
The Court returned to the issue in 1993, in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.37 Santeria is a Cuban religion that 
combines elements of Catholicism with elements of Yoruba religion 
from West Africa.38 Its central ritual is the sacrifice of small 
animals.39 There were an estimated 50,000 Santerians in South 
Florida, mostly practicing in secret.40 
When the Church of the Lukumi proposed to take the faith 
public, Hialeah passed four ordinances to prohibit animal sacrifice. 
They were drafted to ban Santeria without affecting any of the other 
myriad reasons why humans kill animals.41 The most tightly 
targeted of these ordinances made it a crime to unnecessarily kill an 
animal in a ritual or ceremony, not for the primary purpose of food 
consumption.42 Omit any ritual and the ordinance did not apply. 
Make the ritual secondary to food production, or persuade the city 
that killing the animal was necessary, and the ordinance did not 
apply. The city said this ordinance was neutral and generally 
applicable; no one could sacrifice an animal as so defined. The 
church had not gotten a single vote in the lower courts,43 which 
highlights how Smith was initially received. 
 
 36. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) 
(“The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith 
requirements is not ‘water[ed] . . . down,’ but ‘really means what it says’ (alteration in 
Lukumi) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 888)); Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (“our decisions in the 
unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where a state has in place a system of 
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ 
without compelling reason”). 
 37. 508 U.S. 520.  
 38. Id. at 524. 
 39. Id. at 525. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 535 (“almost the only conduct subject to Ordinances 87-40, 87-52, and 87-71 
is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. The texts show that they were drafted 
in tandem to achieve this result.”). 
 42. Id. at 551 (setting out Ordinance 87-52). 
 43. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) (ruling against the church even before Smith, on other grounds), aff’d mem., 
936 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1991) (after Smith), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied (unreported; without 
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The Supreme Court reversed, 9-0. These ordinances were not 
neutral,44 they were not generally applicable,45 and the Court said 
they didn’t come close.46 The Court discussed neutrality and 
general applicability in separate sections of the opinion.47 It still did 
not define either term. It discussed neutrality in terms of 
“targeting” religion, the “purpose” or “object” of a law, and 
discrimination “because of” religion.48 But no such language 
appeared in the section on general applicability. Instead, the Court 
applied what amounts to a standard. 
The city said that animal sacrifice undermined government 
interests in public health and in protecting animals. But the 
ordinances failed to regulate other activities that undermined those 
same interests, to the same or greater degree.49 And not just other 
killings of animals, the most obvious analogy. The city’s health 
officer admitted that the garbage dumpsters of restaurants were a 
bigger health hazard than the carcasses of sacrificed animals. But 
one was banned and the other was not. So the ban on sacrifice was 
not generally applicable.50 
It was an element of the offense that killing the animal be 
unnecessary, and the city said that religious killings were 
unnecessary. Of course they are unnecessary only if the religion is 
false, which is clearly what the city believed. No American 
government gets to decide which religions are true and which are 
false, but the Supreme Court did not say that. It made a different 
point of broader potential application: that when the city said that 
secular killings were necessary but religious killings were not, it 
“devalues religious reasons for killing” animals, “judging them to 
be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons.”51 
 
a dissenting vote); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY VOLUME TWO: THE FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSE 153–54 (2011) (reviewing the litigation in the court of appeals, and summarizing its 
four-sentence order affirming on the opinion of the trial court). I was lead appellate counsel 
for the church, so I report these unreported facts from personal knowledge. 
 44. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532–40, 542 (opinion of the Court); id. at 540–42 (plurality 
opinion). 
 45. Id. at 542–46 (opinion of the Court). 
 46. Id. at 543 (“these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to 
protect First Amendment rights.”). 
 47. Id. at 532–42 (neutrality); id. at 542–46 (general applicability). 
 48. Id. at 532–35, 538, 542. 
 49. Id. at 543. 
 50. Id. at 544–45. 
 51. Id. at 537. 
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So once again, if we take the Court’s reasoning seriously, many 
laws will fail the test of general applicability; many laws that 
burden religion will require compelling justification. Any time the 
government prohibits a religious practice but exempts some 
analogous secular practice that undermines the alleged 
government interest, it decides that the secular practice is more 
important, more valuable, more something that makes it more 
deserving of exemption. Government devalues the religious 
practice as compared to the secular practice. 
I do not claim that the Court understood or consciously 
intended all of this in Smith, or even in Lukumi. “Neutral and 
generally applicably law” was an undefined intuitive concept in 
Smith. A criminal prohibition with literally no exceptions qualified 
if anything did, so the Court had no occasion to examine the 
concept or clarify its intuition. Lukumi made clear that Smith had 
not repealed the Free Exercise Clause and that the requirements of 
neutrality and general applicability had enforceable content. But 
Lukumi was at the other end of the continuum from Smith, with laws 
that obviously were neither neutral nor generally applicable, so the 
Court said that it “need not define with precision” the meaning of 
general applicability.52 
But the rule that secular exceptions generally require religious 
exceptions is not some creative reinterpretation dreamed up years 
after the opinions were issued. The requirement was there in Smith 
if one read carefully. Smith unambiguously concluded that the 
unemployment compensation law in Sherbert was not neutral or 
generally applicable, and much followed from that conclusion. 
I noted the opinion’s two sides at the time, reading its rhetoric 
to suggest a general rule of no exemptions and its many limits as 
creating “enough exceptions and limitations to swallow most of its 
new rule.”53 If the exceptions and limitations were not taken 
seriously, then Smith created “the legal framework for 
persecution.”54 But if the Court were serious about the limitations 
 
 52. Id. at 542. 
 53. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 54. 
 54. Id. at 54, 59. 
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and exceptions, “then much religious exercise can still claim 
judicial protection.”55 
I have not quite been accused of making this up years after the 
fact, but I have been accused of now making an argument that 
“would largely eviscerate Smith’s no-exemptions-required rule.”56 
If Smith really laid down a flat rule that no exemptions are required, 
then renewed attention to the requirement of “generally applicable 
law” would do substantial damage—perhaps even “eviscerate” 
—that alleged rule. But the question is whether Smith created such 
a rule for nearly all challenged laws, or only for those laws that are 
truly neutral and generally applicable, and if the latter, what counts 
as neutral and generally applicable. I elaborated the protective 
reading of Smith at the time: 
In such individualized decisionmaking processes, the Court’s 
explanation of its unemployment compensation cases would 
seem to require that religion get something analogous to most-
favored nation status. Religious speech should be treated as well 
as political speech, religious land uses should be treated as well 
as any other land use of comparable intensity, and so forth. . . . 
The other point in the Court’s explanation of its unemployment 
compensation cases is secular exemptions. If the state grants 
exemptions from its law for secular reasons, then it must grant 
comparable exemptions for religious reasons. . . . 
The requirement that religious conduct get the benefit of secular 
exemptions is a requirement of broad potential application. . . . 
Exemptions for secular interests without exemptions for religious 
practice reflect a hostile indifference to religion. . . . [S]uch a 
discriminatory pattern of exemptions shows that the legislature’s 
goals do not require universal application, and that the legislature 
values the exempted secular activities more highly than the 
constitutionally protected religious activities. This pattern of 
exemptions reflects a legislative judgment that the free exercise of 
religion is less important than the demands of some special 
interest group of no constitutional significance. But that is a 
judgment inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee.57 
 
 55. Id. at 42. 
 56. James M. Oleske, Jr., Free Exercise (Dis)Honesty 42, https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3262826, forthcoming in 2019 WIS. L REV. 
 57. Laycock, supra note 53, at 49–51. 
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All these implications were clearly there from the beginning, 
but few seemed to notice. Between Smith and Lukumi, lower courts 
gave no weight to Smith’s limitations and exceptions. After Lukumi, 
that began to change. But on its facts, Lukumi was an extreme case; 
the ordinances were clearly enacted to suppress a single religious 
practice. Government lawyers argue that every law is neutral and 
generally applicable except a few rare laws as extreme as the 
ordinances in Lukumi. And a few lower courts have actually 
attended to the issue and then agreed.58 
But more courts have concluded that even one or a few secular 
exceptions, if they undermine the interest the law is alleged to 
protect, show that the law is not generally applicable. Most 
prominently, Newark had a rule that police officers must be clean 
shaven, with a medical exception for officers with skin conditions 
that make it difficult to shave. That was it; only one relevant 
exception. But the court of appeals said that Newark had to also 
exempt Muslim officers religiously obligated to grow a beard. 
Newark had made a value judgment that medical needs are more 
important than religious needs, and that value judgment is what 
Smith and Lukumi forbid.59 The Newark opinion in the Third Circuit 
was written by a judge most readers will have heard of, Samuel 
Alito. There are nine or so similar decisions in courts around  
the country.60 
 
 58. A leading case, and probably the most extreme of these decisions, is Stormans Inc. 
v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015). It is analyzed at length in Douglas Laycock & 
Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1 
(2016). Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 649–55 (10th Cir. 
2006), holds a zoning law generally applicable. Most zoning laws are highly individualized 
and subject to many exceptions, but in this case the city had apparently never granted an 
exception for any daycare center, which was the church’s requested use.  
 59. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364–66 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 60. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 738–40 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding rule prohibiting 
counseling student from referring same-sex couple to another counselor not generally 
applicable where there were exceptions for other values conflicts and for failure to pay); 
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 206–12 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding permit requirement 
for keeping animals not generally applicable where there were exceptions for zoos, circuses, 
hardship, and extraordinary circumstances); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding zoning ordinance that excluded synagogue not neutral 
and not generally applicable where there was exception for lodges and private clubs); 
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 165–68 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding 
textually absolute rule prohibiting posting or attachment of any sign to government property 
not neutral where variety of exceptions had been made in practice); Keeler v. Mayor of 
Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879, 885–86 (D. Md. 1996) (holding landmarking ordinance subject 
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II. THE SECULAR EXCEPTION IN MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP 
This at last brings me back to Masterpiece Cakeshop. Masterpiece 
is one of a handful of cases where conscientious objectors in the 
wedding business refuse to assist with a same-sex wedding and get 
sued under a state public-accommodations law, or in a few of the 
cases, feel threatened by such a law and sue to enjoin its 
enforcement or have it declared unconstitutional as applied to their 
religiously motivated actions. 
These vendors understand marriage as an inherently religious 
relationship, and therefore they understand weddings as 
inherently religious events. Jack Phillips, the owner and cake artist 
at Masterpiece Cakeshop, testified to this understanding, citing 
various scriptural bases for marriage and concluding that his 
objection “has everything to do with the nature of the wedding 
ceremony itself, and about my religious belief about what marriage 
is and whether God will be pleased with me and my work.”61 “The 
issue was the nature of the event and that I cannot participate in 
such a ceremony based on my sincerely held religious beliefs.”62 
The wedding vendors’ job is to make their part of the wedding 
the best and most memorable it can be; they quite reasonably 
understand themselves to be promoting and celebrating the 
wedding and the marriage. The Washington florist in a similar case 
had happily served her long-time gay customer, knowing that the 
 
to strict scrutiny where there were exceptions for financial hardship to owner, substantial 
benefit to city, and best interests of community); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551–
56 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding requirement that freshman live in dorm not generally applicable 
where one-third of freshmen were exempt for diverse array of reasons); Mitchell Cty. v. 
Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1, 15–16 (Iowa 2012) (holding ban on steel-wheeled tractors not 
generally applicable where state and county permitted other wheel coverings that did similar 
damage to roads); Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 556–57 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding ban on possession of bird feathers not neutral where there were exceptions for 
taxidermists, academics, researchers, museums, and educational institutions). There is also 
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2004), which reversed summary 
judgment for defendants where a single exception granted to another student, and earlier 
exceptions granted to plaintiff, suggested that defendant had a system of individualized 
exemptions. But Axson-Flynn curiously distinguished individualized exemptions from 
categorical exemptions, even though Lukumi relied on many categorical exceptions, and even 
though categorical exemptions are generally broader, giving favored treatment to more 
people, than individualized exemptions. 
 61. Joint Appendix 167, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4232758. 
 62. Id. 
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flowers were for his same-sex partner, but she said that she could 
not do the wedding.63 To believers like these, the wedding is a 
religious event that is religiously prohibited. It is a sacrilege, and 
they cannot participate. 
These cases have mostly been litigated under state-law 
protections for religious liberty. They have mostly been in blue or 
purple states, because those are the only states with state-wide gay-
rights laws.64 And before the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Masterpiece, the religious claimants nearly all lost—a photographer 
in New Mexico,65 a baker in Oregon,66 a bed and breakfast in 
Hawaii,67 a wedding venue in New York,68 videographers in 
Minnesota,69 the florist in Washington.70 The Washington florist has 
lost again on remand,71 and a website designer in Colorado has lost 
a pre-enforcement challenge to the law that was at issue in 
Masterpiece.72 Religious claimants continue to lose in these cases in 
part because the judges have so far read Masterpiece narrowly, and 
 
 63. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 549 (Wash. 2015), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 
2671 (2018). 
 64. On the extremely small chance that anyone is reading this Article decades from 
now, when usage might have changed, blue states are states where the Democratic party has 
a normally reliable majority. In red states, the Republican party has a normally reliable 
majority. Purple states are more closely contested states that may swing back and forth 
between the two major parties. 
 65. Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
 66. Klein v. Or. Bur. of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), review denied 
(Or. June 21, 2018), vacated, 2019 WL 2493912 (U.S. June 17, 2019). 
 67. Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, 415 P.3d 919 (Hawaii Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
rejected, 2018 WL 3358586 (Hawaii July 10, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1319 (2019). 
 68. Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016). 
 69. Telescope Media Group v. Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal 
pending, No. 17-3352 (8th Cir.). 
 70. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2015), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). 
 71.  State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, 2019 WL 2382063 (Wash. June 6, 2019) 
(emphasizing the passages in Masterpiece favorable to gay rights, id. at *6–7, acknowledging 
that Masterpiece precludes adjudicatory bodies from discriminating against religion, id. at *8, 
but concluding that the state’s Attorney General remains free to discriminate against 
religion, id. at *9–11).  
 72.   303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 16-cv-02372, 2019 WL 2161666 (D. Colo. May 17, 
2019) (disregarding Masterpiece on the ground that the Court “avoided a ruling on the 
merits,” id. at *3, and granting summary judgment to the state enforcement officer on the 
basis of a pro-government reading of Smith and Lukumi, id. at *11). This case involved only 
the provision prohibiting communications suggesting that some customers would be 
unwelcome on the basis of their membership in a protected class. Plaintiff’s challenge to the 
provision requiring that it serve such customers was dismissed for lack of standing. Id. at *3 
n.5; Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 52. 
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more fundamentally, because the records in these cases were 
compiled before Masterpiece, so they did not contain evidence of 
discrimination of the sort on which Masterpiece relied.  
A California baker won on free-speech grounds in a state trial 
court.73 Given the California Supreme Court’s resistance to 
religious exemptions,74 it seemed likely that this decision would be 
reversed, but for whatever reason—possibly the intervening 
decision in Masterpiece—the plaintiff state agency did not appeal.75 
At least two other cases, each involving ordinances enacted by blue 
cities in red states, are still pending in state courts.76 The Oregon 
case is still pending in the state courts on remand, and presumably, 
a new cert petition will be filed in the Washington case. 
Masterpiece arose in Colorado, which has no statute protecting 
religious practices from the state and no decision squarely deciding 
whether the free exercise clause of the state constitution creates a 
right to religious exemptions.77 So federal claims played a larger 
 
 73. Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., No. BCV-17- 
102855 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb 5, 2018), https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu 
/cases/department-fair-employment-housing-v-cathys-creations/ [https://perma.cc 
/WC5X-LA24]. 
 74. N. Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cty. Sup’r Ct., 189 P.3d 
959 (Cal. 2008) (refusing to exempt medical practice where one physician declined to provide 
artificial insemination to lesbian patient and patient was successfully treated by another 
physician in the same practice); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Sup’r Ct., 85 P.3d 
67 (Cal. 2004) (refusing to exempt Catholic Charities from obligation to cover contraception 
in its employee insurance plan); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 
1996) (refusing to exempt owner of small building from renting to unmarried couple). 
 75. Appellant’s Opening Brief 9, Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. Cathy’s Creations, 
Inc., No. F0077802 in Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 2018 WL 5014291 (Oct. 12, 2018). This is an 
appeal from a denial of attorneys’ fees to the defendant baker. The chronology in plaintiff’s 
appellate brief is unclear. It says that the trial court entered judgment on May 1, 2018. Id. at 
12. The state had sixty days to appeal. Cal. R. of Ct. 8.104. Masterpiece came down on June 4, 
within that sixty-day period. But plaintiff filed its motion for attorneys’ fees on May 10, 
before Masterpiece and long before the time for appeal had expired. Brief at 12. The state’s 
brief does not clarify. Respondent’s Brief, 2018 WL 6002854 (Nov. 13, 2018). 
 76. Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018) 
(rejecting challenge to ordinance requiring calligraphers to produce invitations and other 
goods for same-sex weddings), review granted (Ariz. Nov. 20, 2018); Lexington Fayette Urban 
Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., No. 2015-CA-00745-MR, 2017 WL 
2211381 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017) (holding that printer did not discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation when he refused to print t-shirts for a gay-pride festival), review granted 
(Ky. Oct. 25, 2017). Note that Hands on Originals, the Kentucky case, is not a wedding case, 
but also that it presents a more straightforward free-speech claim, because the printer is 
being asked to print an explicit message in somewhat permanent form). 
 77. COLO. CONST. art II, § 4. 
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role. The Masterpiece baker, Jack Phillips, claimed that his cakes 
were works of art protected by the Free Speech Clause. And if you 
look at the pictures of his cakes, that claim is not crazy.78 But it is 
hard to find a logical stopping point. If cake decorating is speech, 
lots of businesses may involve elements of speech. At the oral 
argument, Phillips’s lawyer had great difficulty persuading justices 
that she could draw a manageable line between products that were 
speech and products that were not.79 
Phillips also had a federal free exercise claim. But for that, he 
had to show that the Colorado law was not neutral, or not generally 
applicable. His lawyers obviously doubted whether he could show 
that; they gave much more attention to the free speech claim.80 
No one who supported the state and the same-sex couple took 
the free-exercise theory seriously. A prominent law professor on a 
listserv, which I am not permitted to cite, said that the Court would 
reject the free speech theory and then dispose of the free-exercise 
theory in a paragraph. This widespread disdain for the free-
exercise claim resulted from the rhetoric of Employment Division v. 
Smith still dominating close textual analysis of Smith and Lukumi. 
I frequently collaborate with Thomas Berg at St. Thomas 
University in Minnesota. Professor Berg and I filed an amicus brief 
devoted solely to free exercise.81 We argued for an exemption only 
for small businesses and only for events directly related to the 
wedding. This focus on the religious context would lead to a much 
narrower exemption than the free speech theory, which would 
have protected even simple bigots in any expressive context instead 
of just those with sincere religious objections in religious contexts. 
The Colorado public-accommodations law had no explicit 
secular exceptions. But we said that it had been enforced in 
discriminatory ways that created an implicit secular exception, and 
this secular exception meant that the law was not generally 
 
 78. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, https://www.masterpiececakes.com [https://perma 
.cc/P2GH-GGQL]. 
 79. Transcript of Oral Argument 11–20, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 6025739. 
 80. See Brief for Petitioners 16–38, Masterpiece, 2017 WL 3913762 (free-speech claim); 
id. at 38–46 (free-exercise claim); id. at 46–48 (hybrid-rights claim). 
 81. Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Masterpiece, 2017 WL 4005662. 
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applicable. The Court did not say that, but it relied on much of the 
same evidence to say something that led to nearly the same place. 
It said that the law was not neutral, because Colorado’s 
enforcement pattern showed hostility to religion.82 
Some of the Civil Rights Commissioners had made hostile 
statements on the record, blaming religious liberty for slavery and 
the Holocaust and calling Jack Phillips’s religious commitments 
“despicable.”83 Views of that sort are very widespread, and some 
commentators have publicly defended these comments,84 but 
public officials have now been warned not to talk about them. So 
those facts may not recur. 
The other evidence is more important. A Christian activist 
named William Jack went to three different bakers, requesting 
cakes in the shape of a Bible, with scriptural quotations hostile to 
same-sex marriage. Some of the messages were offensive from the 
perspective of most people who did not already share Jack’s views. 
Jack had not requested just any anti-gay cake, but explicitly religious 
anti-gay cakes. Each baker refused to make his cake, he charged 
them with religious discrimination, and the Civil Rights Division 
(the prosecuting arm of the Commission) dismissed the charges.85 
The same Colorado law that prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation also prohibits discrimination on the  
basis of “creed,” which the accompanying regulations define to 
include any religious practice or belief.86 So the Colorado courts 
had to explain why the Masterpiece baker violated the statute and 
the bakers in the William Jack cases didn’t. And in the course of 
doing that, the Colorado Court of Appeals said some deeply 
inconsistent things. 
Most fundamentally, it said that refusing to make a cake closely 
associated with same-sex couples discriminated on the basis of 
 
 82. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32. 
 83. Id. at 1729–30. 
 84. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 133, 138–43 (2018). 
 85. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31. 
 86. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (Thomson Reuters 2015) (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of protected classifications); 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1:10.2(H) (clarifying that 
the law’s prohibition of creedal discrimination protects “all aspects of religious beliefs, 
observances or practices . . . as well as the beliefs or teachings of a particular religion, church, 
denomination or sect”). 
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sexual orientation, but that refusing to make a cake closely 
associated with conservative Christians did not discriminate on the 
basis of religion.87 
For the protected bakers, the court assumed that the cake’s 
message would be the bakers’ message and not just the customers’; 
the protected bakers could lawfully object to “the offensive nature 
of the requested message.”88 For Jack Phillips, the court said that a 
wedding cake would send no message, but if it did send one, it 
would be the customer’s message, not the baker’s.89 
The protected bakers’ willingness to produce cakes with other 
“Christian themes” for other Christian customers was treated as 
exonerating.90 Petitioner’s willingness to produce other cakes and 
baked goods for same-sex couples was treated as irrelevant.91 
For Jack Phillips, the fact that he would merely be complying 
with the law meant that he would send no message.92 For the other 
bakers, this argument went unmentioned. 
The court also said that in the William Jack cases, the customer 
wanted objectionable words or symbols on the cake, but that in Jack 
Phillips’s discussion with the same-sex couple that sued him, he did 
not learn what they wanted on their cake.93 This argument has been 
picked up very widely on the same-sex couples’ side of the debate,94 
but it is deeply disingenuous. 
In the actual transaction, Phillips could surely assume that the 
couple wanted some words or symbols on the cake, and an essential 
part of his task was to help them choose those words and symbols.95 
In any event, the very purpose of a wedding cake is to celebrate the 
 
 87.    Compare Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 282 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2015) (holding that opposition to same-sex marriage shows motive to discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation, because the two are “closely correlated”), rev’d, Masterpiece, 138 
S. Ct. 1719, with id. at 282 n.8 (concluding that opposition to religious message does not show 
motive to discriminate on the basis of religion). 
 88. Id. at 282 n.8. 
 89. Id. at 286. 
 90. Id. at 282 n.8. 
 91. Id. at 282. 
 92. Id. at 286. 
 93. Id. at 285, 288. 
 94. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 155; Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson 
Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMM. 171, 189–90 (2019).  
 95. Joint Appendix at 161, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4232758. 
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wedding and the marriage, with or without an inscription. As even 
the Colorado court said, the couple asked Phillips to “design and 
create a cake to celebrate their same-sex wedding.”96 
And under the rest of the Colorado court’s reasoning, the case 
would have come out the same way even if the conversation had 
lasted longer and the couple had said they wanted two men in 
tuxedos, “David ♥ Charlie,” a rainbow, or any other more explicit 
message. The court’s logic would still have said that it would be  
the customer’s message, not the baker’s; that the baker would 
merely be doing what the law required; and that refusing to 
produce a message so closely associated with same-sex couples 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. I do not believe 
that the Civil Rights Commission or the Colorado Court of Appeals 
would rule any differently in a case where the couple requested an  
explicit message. 
Most fundamentally, I don’t believe it because if refusing a cake 
with an explicit message is protected, then the conscientiously 
objecting bakers win. They just need to know enough law to keep 
the conversation going until the explicit message is chosen or 
revealed. Protection for explicit messages would not be much help 
to florists or caterers, but it would largely solve the problem for 
bakers, printers, calligraphers, and website designers. And the gay-
rights side of this debate will not settle for that. A pending 
Kentucky case does involve an explicit message—a printer asked to 
make t-shirts with the words “Lexington Pride Festival 2012” and 
a series of rainbow-colored circles—and the enforcement agency 
and its amici are all arguing that the printer discriminated when he 
refused to print that message and that his free-speech rights are no 
defense.97 
Even if the Colorado court’s alleged distinctions were more 
persuasive, and even if they succeeded in placing the two sets of 
bakers in different doctrinal categories under state law, that would 
not change the bottom line. The conscience of bakers who support 
same-sex marriage, or refuse to oppose same-sex marriage, is 
 
 96. Craig, 370 P.3d at 276 (emphasis added), rev’d, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719. 
 97. Lexington Fayette Urban Cty. Human Rights Comm’n v. Hands on Originals, Inc., 
No. 2015-CA-00745-MR, 2017 WL 2211381, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. May 12, 2017), review granted 
(Ky. Oct. 25, 2017). 
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protected. The conscience of bakers who object to same-sex 
marriage is not protected. 
This discrimination is like the ordinance in R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul,98 where racial epithets were illegal, but “racist,” “bigot,” and 
a vast range of other offensive epithets were permitted. State law 
placed the two sets of epithets in different doctrinal categories, and 
the correlation between the epithets hurled and the speakers and 
viewpoints regulated was imperfect. But these distinctions could 
not save a regime that effectively “license[d] one side of a debate to 
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of 
Queensberry rules.”99 It is no more defensible for Colorado to allow 
one side to follow the dictates of conscience while requiring the 
other side to submit its conscience to the demands of any customer 
who walks in the door. 
The Supreme Court did not invoke R.A.V., and it did not rely 
on all the evidence I have outlined. But it relied on important parts 
of it. It noted the inconsistency about whether any message would 
be the baker’s message or the customer’s message,100 and the 
inconsistency about the bakers’ willingness to provide other goods 
and services to the protected class.101 And it focused on the 
Colorado court’s statement that the protected bakers could refuse 
to provide the “offensive” message that William Jack had 
requested. “A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of 
these two instances cannot be based on the government’s own 
assessment of offensiveness.”102 
Much of the commentary has treated the Court’s decision as 
confined to an odd set of facts, and as avoiding the underlying 
question of whether wedding vendors with conscientious 
objections can be required to assist with same-sex weddings.103 But 
these facts are readily reproducible. Wedding vendors seeking 
exemptions can send testers like William Jack to request an 
offensively conservative religious version of the same goods or 
services. And we can confidently expect state enforcement officials 
to react just as they did in Colorado, protecting the conscience of 
 
 98. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 99. Id. at 392. 
 100. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1730. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1731. 
 103. See supra note 2. 
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the vendors they agree with. If liberal business people don’t have 
to provide conservative religious goods or services that they find 
offensive or violative of conscience, then Masterpiece says that 
conservative believers don’t have to do same-sex weddings that 
offend them and violate their conscience. 
This means that the Supreme Court has gone much further than 
is generally recognized toward protecting wedding vendors. And 
it has taken a substantial step toward the protective understanding 
of Employment Division v. Smith—that even one or a few secular 
exceptions make a law not neutral, or not generally applicable. If 
the law is not neutral, or not generally applicable, religious 
conscientious objectors are entitled to an exemption unless there is 
a compelling government interest in requiring them to comply. 
And the state’s willingness to grant secular exemptions seriously 
undermines any claim to a compelling interest in enforcing the law 
without exceptions. 
III. RATIONALIZING UNEQUAL TREATMENT 
This requirement to treat claims consistently will be effective 
only if courts take it seriously. States will try to manipulate their 
rules to justify unequal treatment of objectors they agree with and 
those they don’t. One such attempted manipulation is the argument 
that Masterpiece and the William Jack cases were distinguishable 
because only William Jack asked bakers to write explicit messages 
in frosting.104 But even if that distinction were valid, it could not be 
generalized; the next conscientious objector may wait until explicit 
words are requested, and the next William Jack may not request 
explicit words or symbols but just explain that the cake is for an 
offensive celebration. 
In Masterpiece, four Justices accepted a manipulative argument 
with much broader potential application. Justice Kagan’s 
concurrence and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent both argued that the 
state’s discrimination could have been justified on the ground that 
the protected bakers would not sell an anti-gay cake to anybody, 
but Phillips would sell wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.105 
 
 104. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
 105. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1750 (Ginsburg,  
J., dissenting). 
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But as Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence explained, this reaches the 
preordained result by manipulating the level of generality.106 It 
treats the anti-gay cake as having a distinctive message, but the pro-
gay cake, the cake for the same-sex wedding, as merely generic. If 
the anti-gay cake is a unique product because of its message, then 
the category is not cakes, or wedding cakes, but cakes with a 
particular message. And with or without words or symbols, the 
point of a wedding cake is to celebrate the wedding and the 
marriage. This may be clearest when the message is explicit; a 
wedding cake with two brides, two male names, or the like is a cake 
that Phillips would not sell to anybody. But with or without such 
symbols, the cake sends a celebratory message in support of a same-
sex wedding. Even the Colorado court acknowledged this when it 
was simply describing the facts and not yet trying to justify its 
decision.107 
Here’s another way to think about the same point. The attempt 
to rationalize what Colorado did would treat an anti-gay cake and 
a gay-pride cake as two different products, and the protected 
bakers wouldn’t make one of those products for anybody. But it 
treats the same-sex wedding cake and the opposite-sex wedding 
cake as the same product, distinguished not by their different 
messages, but only by the identity of the customer. State law can 
treat each of these pairs of cakes as comprising one product or two. 
But it cannot say that one pair of cakes is the same—just one 
product—and that the other pair is different—two distinct 
products. Both pairs are the same at one level of generality—two 
cakes about gay rights, or two cakes about weddings—and both 
cakes are different at a more specific level of generality,  
expressing opposite views of the common subject matter. We come 
back to the same basic contradiction. The Colorado courts, and the 
liberal Justices, treated Jack Phillips as making a decision about the 
customer, but the protected bakers as making a decision about  
the message. 
Colorado invoked this distinction to avoid enforcing its statute 
in a generally applicable way. Colorado prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, and on the basis of creed, in the same 
terms in the same statute. It has asserted an interest in preventing 
 
 106. Id. at 1737–39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 107. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination against groups that have historically been the 
targets of widespread discrimination, or on the basis of 
classifications that have historically been the bases for widespread 
discrimination. It did not have to include both religion and sexual 
orientation in that protection, but it quite sensibly chose to do so. 
That choice defined the reach of Colorado’s interest in the case. The 
state’s conclusion that the law did not apply to the William Jack 
bakers undermined its interest in ending discrimination to the same 
extent as a conclusion that Masterpiece Cakeshop was entitled to 
exemption from the law on grounds of religious liberty—or less 
plausibly but more parallel to the William Jack holdings, that 
Masterpiece had not violated the law. 
Lawrence Sager and Nelson Tebbe endorse these alleged 
distinctions between Masterpiece and the William Jack cases, but 
they also make a much more sweeping claim.108 They repeatedly 
invoke Charles Black’s famous defense of the desegregation 
decisions: African-Americans’ right to equal treatment trumped 
any alleged white right not to associate, because there was no 
equivalence between the white and black populations in the 
American South in the middle of the twentieth century.109 “[A] 
whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which is 
set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an 
inferior station.”110 Professor Black briefly described a system of 
pervasive segregation in every aspect of life that “comes down in 
apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case,”111 in 
which blacks were denied voting rights and barred “from all 
political power,”112 in which separate facilities were “almost never 
really equal” and black schools were “so disgracefully inferior to 
white schools” that to call them equal was a “Molochian child-
destroying lie.”113 
 
 108. Sager & Tebbe, supra note 94, at 173, 187, 187–88.  
 109. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.  
421 (1960). 
 110. Id. at 424  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 425. 
 113. Id. at 425–26. Moloch was “a Canaanite deity associated in biblical sources with . . . 
child sacrifice.” Noah Tesch, Moloch, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www 
.britannica.com/topic/Moloch-ancient-god [https://perma.cc/UF2M-LLHF]. 
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He might have added that in this system, whites controlled the 
vast majority of economic power and resources; nonwhite income 
per capita in the South was about half of white income.114 There was 
an African-American middle class in major cities,115 sustained in 
part by segregation, which created a self-contained African-
American market. But many or most African-Americans were 
economically dependent on the whites who oppressed them.116 
Threatened or actual violence further enforced the system.117 This 
system had the overwhelming support of whites in the South, and 
intense social pressure forced most potential dissenters to keep  
any doubts to themselves.118 Southern “moderates” were 
segregationists who were reluctant to defy the courts.119 
Sager and Tebbe’s assertion that the LGBT community is in a 
similar situation today is absurd, and they make essentially no 
effort to support their claim. Certainly gays and lesbians were 
treated badly in the past, and the problem has not been entirely 
 
 114. Data squarely comparable to current data on same-sex couples have been difficult 
to find, but several data sets yield a consistent picture. Among male workers employed for 
twelve months in 1939, urban nonwhites in the South earned 41% of what whites earned; 
rural nonwhites earned 37%. GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 105 tbl.9 (2d 
ed. 1971). In 1950, black male income as a proportion of white male income in southern 
Standard Metropolitan Areas ranged from 37% in Montgomery, Alabama to 76% in El Paso, 
Texas (where only 2.4% of the population was black). Calculated from id. at 124–25 tbl.12. 
The central tendency appears to have been just over 50%. Id. Either this was a good bit better 
than in 1939, possibly because of the post-war boom, or the situation in the largest cities was 
a good bit better than in smaller cities, or a combination of the two. I could not find data for 
the South in 1960, but nationwide, white median family income was $5835; the nonwhite 
median was $3233, or 55% of white income. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
1962 at 334, tbl.450. Of course the numbers for African-Americans would have been worse 
in the South. BECKER, supra, at 116. 
 115. See J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND 
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 34 (1961). 
 116. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (noting that “fear of 
community hostility and economic reprisals” led many members of National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People to drop their membership when city demanded 
membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (noting 
“uncontroverted showing” that disclosure of NAACP’s membership lists had resulted in 
“economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility”). 
 117. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (noting “substantial uncontroverted evidence” of 
“harassment and threats of bodily harm” when NAACP membership was revealed); 
Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462 (recognizing “threat of physical coercion” for NAACP members). 
 118. See, e.g., PELTASON, supra note 115, at 9–10 (reporting how federal judges were 
ostracized for enforcing the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions). 
 119. Id. at 33–35. 
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solved. We might plausibly say that the combination of sodomy 
laws, moral disapproval, and employment discrimination was a 
“system” designed to keep gays and lesbians in the closet. But even 
at its peak, that system was not remotely so pervasive, and did not 
reach nearly so many parts of life, as segregation in the American 
South. And any such system has been declining for decades. Most 
obviously, the sodomy laws had not been enforced for many years 
before they were finally held unconstitutional in 2003.120 
In contrast to monolithic southern-white support for 
subordinating African-Americans when Professor Black wrote, 
Gallup reports that 67% of Americans believe that same-sex 
marriages should be valid and with the same rights as traditional 
marriages.121 The Public Religion Research Institute found 62% 
support with a somewhat larger sample size and somewhat 
differently worded question.122 In the PRRI survey, 31% strongly 
supported same-sex marriage, and only 14% were strongly 
opposed.123 Majorities in every state now support gay-rights 
legislation124—which of course does not mean that it can be passed 
everywhere, especially without religious exemptions—and gay 
reporters write optimistic columns about rapid progress in  
red states.125 
 
 120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003) (reviewing the long history of non-
enforcement with respect to consensual sodomy in private). Police surveillance designed to 
enforce the sodomy laws at least in public restrooms was a serious hazard for gay men at a 
time when most were in the closet and had difficulty finding each other. One famous such 
incident was the arrest in 1964 of presidential aide Walter Jenkins for a same-sex encounter 
in a YMCA changing room. Laura Smith, When LBJ’s Closest Aide Was Caught in a Gay Sex 
Sting, the President Caved—the First Lady Stood Up, TIMELINE (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://timeline.com/walter-jenkins-gay-lbj-21d71a731021 [https://perma.cc/WZ23-
673A]. 
 121. Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage,  GALLUP (May 
23, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/234866/two-three-americans-support-sex-
marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MDF-M8UD]. 
    122.  Daniel Greenberg, Maxine Najle, Oyindamola Bola & Robert P. Jones, Fifty Years 
After Stonewall: Widespread Support for LGBT Issues—Findings from American Values Atlas 2018, 
https://www.prri.org/research/fifty-years-after-stonewall-widespread-support-for-lgbt 
-issues-findings-from-american-values-atlas-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Q7QX-3Y2C].  
    123.  Id. 
    124.  Id. 
    125.  Samantha Allen, How “Real America” Became Queer America, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 
2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/opinion/lgbt-trump-red-states.html [https: 
//perma.cc/S59H-DU2K]. 
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The LGBT community votes without hindrance and is an 
important part of the working coalition of one of our two major 
political parties; it is guaranteed strong political support from that 
party. It is not segregated; there are no segregated facilities or 
segregated schools to be equal or unequal. 
In Census Bureau data, same-sex couples report higher 
educational achievement, higher rates of employment, and higher 
median incomes than opposite-sex couples.126 Read that sentence 
again; these are unexpected data. These differences hold even when 
all cohabiting same-sex couples, married and unmarried, are 
compared to married opposite-sex couples; the differences are 
larger when only same-sex and opposite-sex married couples are 
compared. These data on income and education are radically 
different from similar data by race, even today and nationwide, let 
alone in the segregated South in 1960.127 
There are well over half a million same-sex married couples in 
the country,128 and the number of litigated cases of religiously 
motivated refusals to provide goods or services to all those 
weddings appears to be in the very low two digits at most.129 No 
 
 126. Characteristics of Same-Sex Couple Households: 2005 to Present, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house 
-characteristics.html (hereinafter Same-Sex Couple Households). The information in the text 
comes from Tables 1 and 2 of the 2017 data. 
 127. For income, see Kayla Fontenot, Jessica Semega & Melissa Kollar, Current 
Population Reports: Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU at 28, 31 
(tbl.A-1), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018 
/demo/p60-263.pdf (reporting median income for white households as $65,273, compared 
to $40,902 for black households). For education, see Educational Attainment in the United  
States 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.1, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018 
/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html (reporting total population and 
numbers of degrees by race, from which it can be calculated that 33% of whites and 23% of 
African-Americans have a bachelor’s degree or higher). Racial differences in employment 
are less dramatic. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S.  
DEP’T LABOR: BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, at tbl.5 under Employment Status, 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XKC-BLCW] (reporting that 
in 2018, 60.7% of whites and 58.3% of blacks were employed). 
 128. Adam P. Romero, 1.1 Million LGBT Adults Are Married to Someone of the Same Sex at 
the Two-Year Anniversary of Obergefell v. Hodges, WILLIAMS INST.: UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Obergefell-2-Year-Marriages 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD3D-ZQAY]; Same-Sex Couple Households, supra note 126 (reporting 
similar numbers). 
 129. I list ten at notes 65–76 supra. One of those (Hands on Originals) is not a wedding 
case, and two (Brush and Nib and 303 Creative) are pre-enforcement challenges, not suits or 
administrative complaints by an actual couple referred elsewhere. Kendrick and 
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doubt there are other couples who preferred to work with a vendor 
who genuinely welcomed their business and who decided that it 
wasn’t worth the time, trouble, and aggravation to sue the 
conscientious objector who referred them elsewhere. Some couples 
see such a referral as gravely offensive, but almost certainly, other 
couples see it as a minor matter if done civilly, part of the friction 
of living in a pluralistic society. Whatever the total numbers, it is 
impossible to conjure a systemic problem out of this handful of 
known cases. 
Of course I do not claim that all problems of hostility to the 
LGBT community have been solved. Sporadic discrimination and 
even violence continues. In some communities, discrimination is 
still widespread, and in those places, if most wedding vendors (or 
the only wedding vendor) discriminate, religious exemptions must 
be denied on compelling interest grounds.130 No doubt all these 
problems are worse, and more widespread, for transgender 
persons than for gays and lesbians. There is still much work to be 
done. But making martyrs of a handful of conscientious objectors is 
a singularly counterproductive way of attempting that work. 
The polling data and the socio-economic data show that these 
remaining problems are very far from systemic. They are not 
remotely comparable to the plight of African-Americans when 
Charles Black wrote. Refusal to protect religious liberty cannot be 
justified by the absurd claim that conservative Christians today 
systematically suppress gays and lesbians in the way that southern 
whites systematically suppressed African-Americans through the 
mid-twentieth century. 
 
Schwartzman list two state administrative-agency cases that I had trouble locating and do 
not list above. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 133 n.2. They also list a Michigan 
case that appears to have focused on the vendor’s literal speech explaining his conscientious 
objection rather than his conduct in serving or not serving some same-sex couple. Country 
Mill Farms, LLC v. City of E. Lansing, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (W.D. Mich. 2017). Probably both 
they and I have missed some. Whatever the exact number, it is very small. 
 130. This has long been my position. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 199–201 (Douglas Laycock, 
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds. 2008) (setting out this position and 
its rationale); LAYCOCK, VOLUME THREE, supra note 4, at 766 (setting out this proviso in the 
statutory text we proposed to state legislatures considering marriage legislation); Douglas 
Laycock, Religious Liberty, Health Care, and the Culture Wars, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH 
IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 32–33 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper, 
eds. 2017) (further explaining the rationale and applying this principle to Catholic hospitals 
with local monopolies over reproductive health care). 
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The Republican Party still opposes gay-rights laws, and neither 
Congress nor red states have enacted such laws. The election of 
Donald Trump was a major setback, reflecting many sources of 
alienation among his voters, including the strength of the reaction 
to racial, sexual, and LGBT equality, but also including the 
existential fears of conservative Christians. They foresee not just 
that the supporters of sexual freedom will gain more rights, but that 
conservative believers will continue to lose rights—that their 
freedom to live their own lives in accordance with their faith is 
targeted and on course to elimination. The wedding-vendor cases, 
which generate publicity all out of proportion to their number, fuel 
this fear. So do all the other culture-war disputes that put religious 
liberty at issue. The Solicitor General’s alarming and foolish answer 
at the oral argument in Obergefell—that tax exemption for churches 
would be at issue in the wake of same-sex marriage131—drove this 
fear to greater heights, creating widespread panic in conservative 
churches.132 Congress and red states will never enact gay-rights 
laws without meaningful religious exemptions; religious 
exemptions are essential to further progress for gay rights. 
Like the LGBT community, conservative believers are a 
minority group with important rights at risk. Recall that only a 
third of the population opposes same-sex marriage. Evangelical 
Protestants are only a quarter of the population,133 and 35 percent 
of them support same-sex marriage.134 The remaining 65 percent 
are only a sixth of the population, and presumably, only some of 
them feel strongly about the issue. Two-thirds of Catholics support 
 
 131. Oral Argument on Question 1, at 38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556 et al.), 2015 WL 1929996. 
 132. See, e.g., David Bernstein, The Supreme Court Oral Argument That Cost Democrats the 
Presidency, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (DEC. 7, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/07/the-supreme-court-oral-argument 
-that-cost-democrats-the-presidency/?utm_term=.7d17f2985d24 [https://perma.cc/584N 
-2HL8] (Dec. 7, 2016) (surveying this and similar issues, and reporting widespread  
alarm about the Solicitor General’s answers in conservative and religious websites  
and publications). 
 133. Pew Research Center, America’s Changing Religious Landscape (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ [https: 
//perma.cc/ECH5-T74D]. 
 134. Pew Research Center, Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://per 
ma.cc/4QPU-SNHD]. 
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same-sex marriage, identical to the number in the general 
population.135 Religious conservatives have been steadily losing on 
sexual issues at least since the 1960s, and in less dramatic ways for 
longer than that. 
Today, the views of religious conservatives are extremely 
unpopular. They are routinely accused of bigotry, hate, and evil.136 
The wedding vendors who refer same-sex couples elsewhere are 
often (I assume routinely, but I don’t know that) targeted with 
boycotts, vandalism, hate mail, and defamatory reviews on 
consumer websites.137 The bakers who turned away William Jack 
did so because of strong moral disapproval of what he was doing 
and asking them to do—moral disapproval strong enough to 
overcome their self-interest in maximizing sales. He experienced 
that moral disapproval just as same-sex couples experience moral 
disapproval when turned away by conservative Christians. 
Conservative religious views on some issues deserve to be 
unpopular. But these views are constitutionally protected religious 
beliefs. Other Americans can disapprove and try to persuade, but 
as the Supreme Court said in Masterpiece, government must treat 
these views with neutrality and tolerance.138 Disapproving private 
citizens can express their disapproval in many ways, but they too 
would do well to treat these constitutionally protected beliefs with 
greater tolerance  
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 
869–71 (collecting examples); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 
88 U. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 407, 415–17 (2011) (collecting more examples); supra notes  
83–84 and accompanying text (noting statements of Civil Rights Commissioners and  
their defenders). 
 137. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 91615-2, 2019 WL 2382063, *3 (Wash. June 6, 
2019) (briefly noting threats and hostile messages directed to conscientious objector in that 
case); infra note 140 and accompanying text (citing reports from Jack Phillips concerning 
Masterpiece Cakeshop); Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE 
OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231, 253–54 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoe 
Robinson, eds. 2016) (collecting news accounts about Sweet Cakes by Melissa and boycotts 
of the whole state of Indiana); Indiana Pizza Restaurant Says It Wouldn’t Cater 
 a Gay Wedding, Supports Religious Freedom Law (April 1, 2015, 5:12 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/indiana-pizza-restaurant-cater-gay-wedding-supports 
-religious/story?id=30045085 [https://perma.cc/HEN2-BJVS?type=image] (describing 
threat of arson and a flood of defamatory Yelp ratings against a pizza restaurant that merely 
answered a reporter’s question about whether it would cater a same-sex wedding). 
138. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018). 
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What is ultimately at stake for both sides is the right to live their 
own lives in accord with their own identities and their own deepest 
values. When Masterpiece Cakeshop declined to do a same-sex 
wedding, it did not threaten those rights for the same-sex couple. 
They understandably felt offended and insulted on that one 
occasion. But their lives went on as before: insofar as anything that 
Jack Phillips did, they still loved each other, they were still married, 
they did not have to change their jobs or occupations, they did not 
have to violate their conscience or their understanding of marriage 
or of sexual attraction. They continued to live in accord with their 
own identity and values. 
The situation is very different for conscientious objectors 
ordered to help celebrate same-sex weddings. They must 
permanently surrender either their conscience or their occupation 
to comply with a state order enforceable by fines, damage awards, 
and the power to punish for contempt of court. Jack Phillips quit 
making wedding cakes in response to Colorado’s order. He gave 
up forty percent of his business and forty percent of his income, and 
laid off most of his employees, to follow his conscience.139 And until 
and unless his right to act on conscience is finally resolved, that loss 
is permanent. If he had made the opposite choice, violating his 
conscience and disrupting or severing his relationship with his 
God, that loss would also have been permanent. 
What we have here are two minority groups, sexual and 
religious, each subject to hostile treatment or regulation supported 
by the other, and each entitled to constitutional protection. 
Colorado was right to protect both groups against discrimination. 
And it was right to hold that bakers deeply offended by the William 
Jack cakes did not have to make those cakes. It was wrong to refuse 
parallel protection to Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop.  
IV. CONTINUING LITIGATION 
Colorado, and at least some gay activists in Colorado, remained 
determined to get Jack Phillips. He reports that his store has been 
vandalized and that he has received death threats and countless 
 
 139. Brief for Petitioners 2, 6, 28, Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017  
WL 3913762. 
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hateful phone calls and e-mails.140 And he has received repeated 
requests for cakes that the purported customer knows he will not 
make.141 Cakes honoring Satan have been a popular request. 
One such test order came on the day the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear his case. It would not have served the tester’s purpose to 
order a wedding cake, because Phillips was no longer making 
wedding cakes for anybody. And the person ordering surely knew 
that; the news was on his website.142 The tester was Autumn 
Scardina, a practicing lawyer who describes her firm and its 
members as “passionate supporters of LGBT rights.”143 So she 
asked for a cake that was blue on the outside, and pink on the 
inside, and she said it was to celebrate her gender transition.144 
Phillips’s wife said they could not make that cake.145 Scardina filed 
a complaint with the Civil Rights Commission, which is why we 
know her identity. And a month after the Supreme Court’s opinion, 
the Commission’s director found that Masterpiece Cakeshop had 
again violated the law.146 
Masterpiece responded with a federal lawsuit to enjoin further 
enforcement efforts by the Civil Rights Commission. The court 
denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss the claims for 
injunctive relief, rejecting the Commission’s argument for Younger 
abstention because Masterpiece had adequately alleged that the 
state was proceeding in bad faith.147 The relevant allegations were 
 
 140. Complaint ¶¶ 159–63, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. 
Colo.), ECF No. 1 (Aug. 14, 2018). 
 141. Id. ¶ 4. 
 142. Masterpiece Cakeshop, http://masterpiececakes.com/wedding-cakes/. As of June 
2019, the content of this page has been blocked or removed. The page as it appeared in April 
2019 is available at https://perma.cc/N7BM-UFD4. 
 143. Scardina Law, https://www.scardinalaw.com/Family-Law/LGBT-Law.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/UP77-BWGP]. 
 144. Determination 2, Charge No. CP2018011310 (Colo. Civil Rights Div. July 2, 2018). 
This Determination does not appear to be available on the website of the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, but it is available on Pacer as Exhibit A to the Complaint in the ensuing 
litigation, supra note 140. 
 145. Id. at 3. 
 146. Id. at 3–4. 
 147. Order 17–23, Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc. v. Elenis, No. 1:18-cv-02074 (D. Colo.), 
ECF No. 94 (Jan. 4, 2019) (hereinafter Order). Younger abstention generally requires federal 
courts to defer adjudication of challenges to state law when the claim could be presented in 
a state enforcement proceeding that was pending before the federal case was filed. See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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of undisputed facts, and the court agreed with Masterpiece on how 
to characterize those facts, finding bad faith in the continued 
unequal treatment of Masterpiece and the bakers that had  
been protected in the William Jack cases.148 For readers inclined to 
blame Republican judges for all such decisions, this one was 
rendered by Judge Wiley Daniel, an African-American judge 
appointed by Bill Clinton.149 
Two months later, in early March 2019, Colorado’s Attorney 
General announced a settlement in which both Masterpiece and the 
Commission dropped all claims against each other.150 But that 
settlement did not bind Scardina, who filed a new lawsuit against 
Masterpiece and Phillips in early June.151 She now alleges that the 
gender-transition cake was really just a birthday cake, and that 
Phillips refused to make a birthday cake for a transgender 
customer.152 This allegation appears to be at least in some tension 
with her earlier allegations to the Civil Rights Commission. 
Scardina’s complaint about her gender-transition cake is a step 
beyond the Supreme Court’s decision in one way that seems 
important to me: it does not involve a wedding. The cake would 
not be served in a religious context, or even in an analogous context; 
there is no religious equivalent to a gender-transition celebration. I 
think that Phillips should still be protected, but for me, this is a 
somewhat harder case than a wedding cake. 
Perhaps it would be harder for the Court as well. The 
Masterpiece opinion did not emphasize the religious significance of 
weddings, and it did not even mention Phillips’s religious 
 
 148. Order, supra note 147, at 17–23. 
 149. Federal Judicial Center, Wiley Young Daniel, https://www.fjc.gov/history 
/judges/daniel-wiley-young [https://perma.cc/PQU4-DGGR]. 
 150. Lawrence Pacheco, State of Colorado and Masterpiece Cakeshop Agree to End All 
Litigation  (Mar. 5, 2019), https://coag.gov/press-room/press-releases/03-05-19 [https: 
//perma.cc/ENJ6-FR6X]; see also Elise Schmelzer, Masterpiece Cakeshop, State of Colorado, 
Agree to Mutual Ceasefire over Harassment, Discrimination Claims, DENVER POST, Mar. 5, 2019, 
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/05/masterpiece-cakeshop-colorado-mutual-cease 
fire-over-claims/ [https://perma.cc/27KR-3BS3] (reporting additional details). 
 151. 4CBS Denver, Third Discrimination Suit Filed Against Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
https://denver.cbslocal.com/2019/06/06/discrimination-lawsuit-lakewood-jack-phillips-
masterpiece-cakeshop/ [https://perma.cc/P973-K44U]. 
 152. Complaint ¶¶ 13–23, Scardina v. Masterpiece Cakeshop Inc., No. 2019CV32214, 
Dist. Ct. for the City and Cty. of Denver, https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/ScardinaMasterpiece-COMPLAINT.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K6L2-6VG8]. 
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understanding of marriage and weddings, but it did briefly 
contrast weddings with other goods and services. The Court 
“assumed” that requiring clergy to perform wedding ceremonies 
over their objections would violate free exercise, said that this 
exception to civil-rights laws must be “confined,” and then noted 
that “there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no 
one could argue implicate the First Amendment.”153 Is a gender-
transition cake such a good? 
I think not; Phillips should be protected from making a cake to 
celebrate a gender transition. The gender-transition cake is still a 
demand that Phillips commit his talents to celebrating something 
deeply at odds with his religious faith. A celebration inherently 
includes a message—that the event celebrated is a good thing, 
worthy of celebrating. That is why Scardina specified a celebration, 
at least as she initially told the story. And Phillips’s claim of 
conscience is still narrowly focused on a particular celebration and 
on a message with high religious significance for him.  
Narrow focus goes to the argument about compelling 
government interest. An exemption for merchants who refuse to 
serve gays or transgender persons at all, or in a wide range of 
transactions, would inflict much more harm on the LGBT 
community. It would threaten frequent refusals of goods or 
services instead of very occasional refusals in a few religiously 
sensitive situations. If Scardina had really ordered just a birthday 
cake, I think that Masterpiece should not be protected. But an 
exemption for celebrating gender transitions would not threaten 
widespread refusals of goods or services to transgender persons. I 
do not think that the state’s interest in this narrowly focused claim 
is compelling. 
And as the federal district court explained, enforcement of the 
Colorado law would still be discriminatory. Colorado has not 
abandoned or repudiated the position it took in the William Jack 
cases. It is apparently still the state’s position that secular bakers 
with views the state agrees with do not have to make cakes they 
find offensive, but conservative bakers with views the state 
disagrees with do have to make cakes they find offensive. So the 
Colorado law is still not generally applicable in my view; it is  
 
 153. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28 
(2018). 
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still administered with hostility to religion and so is not neutral in 
the Supreme Court’s view. Either way, the compelling interest test 
still applies. 
Colorado backed away from pursuing Phillips and a test case, 
but the private plaintiff has sued Masterpiece again, and more cases 
are in the pipeline.154 If this issue returns to the Court, Justice 
Kennedy will no longer be there; Justice Kavanaugh will be. With 
Kennedy’s retirement, there is no one left from the Court that 
decided Employment Division v. Smith.155 There has been a 
generational transition in the conservative legal movement. 
The modern conservative legal movement began in reaction to 
what it perceived as the activism of the Warren Court.156 It 
emphasized deference to the political branches, and that was the 
theme of the Smith opinion. Justice Scalia wasn’t hostile to religion; 
he was hostile to the judicial balancing of interests inherent in the 
compelling government interest test. Better that small religions be 
disadvantaged, he said, than that judges balance the believer’s 
interest in every religious practice against the government’s 
interest in regulating that practice.157 
Scalia plainly envisioned that the victims of his decision would 
be small religions and idiosyncratic religious practices.158 He did 
not foresee that our largest religions—his religion—would need the 
protections of religious liberty for moral teachings of great 
importance to them. 
Both of these things have changed. Today’s conservative judges 
are as activist as the Warren Court ever was. Decades in the judicial 
majority can lead you to believe that judicial activism is a good 
thing. If you have the power, you will eventually decide to use it. 
And in the highly visible culture-war cases, the victimized religions 
today are conservative Christians—Catholics and evangelicals 
most frequently. The Court’s conservatives have vigorously 
 
 154. See supra note 152 (new Masterpiece suit); supra notes 71–72, 76 (cases in pipeline). 
 155. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 156. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (condemning many Warren Court decisions as unprincipled). 
 157. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5, 890 (rejecting a system “in which judges weigh the social 
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs”). 
 158. Id. at 890 (“leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in”). 
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enforced the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, most 
notably in the contraception cases.159 If the Court takes another 
wedding-vendor case, and if Jack Phillips’s amicus brief tells the 
story of the carefully contrived case of the gender-transition cake 
and the district court’s finding that the state acted in bad faith, the 
conservatives are likely to see persecution—a concerted effort to 
force Phillips to surrender his faith or his business. They will likely 
want to protect wedding vendors with a clear rule that states 
cannot misinterpret or evade. Lest this paragraph be 
misunderstood: active enforcement of textually explicit 
constitutional rights is generally a good thing. And the Free 
Exercise Clause is a textually explicit right. Other recent decisions 
are far more activist and dubious, but it is no part of this Article to 
survey those decisions here. 
Some religious conservatives look forward to Smith being 
overruled. That could happen; four Justices recently invited 
litigants to explicitly present the question.160 And that would be a 
better solution than the one I have outlined here. Overruling Smith 
would eliminate arguments about whether secular exceptions, like 
that granted to the William Jack bakers, are really exceptions and 
really analogous to the challenged regulation of religious practice. 
Courts could go directly to what should be the real issues: whether 
a religious practice has been burdened and whether that burden is 
justified by a compelling government interest. 
Masterpiece points the way to a solution that is more 
complicated, but perhaps easier for the Court than a square 
overruling: the Court will build up the protective parts of Smith, the 
requirement that laws burdening religion be neutral and generally 
applicable. Any secular exception that undermines the interest 
offered to justify regulation of religion will show both that the law 
is not generally applicable and that it serves no compelling interest. 
Such an exception may be written into the law, or it may emerge as 
a matter of interpretation. It may be labeled as an exception, or as a 
 
 159. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 
U.S. 682 (2014); see also Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006) (unanimously relying on RFRA to protect right to use mildly hallucinogenic tea 
in worship service). 
 160. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in 
denial of certiorari). 
 
004.LAYCOCK_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  3:41 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
202 
gap in coverage, or as a claim that one side simply didn’t violate 
the law and the other side did.161 
Masterpiece gets most of the way there. Its emphasis on the 
state’s hostility to Phillips’s faith did it the hard way; it means that 
those working to minimize the holding can still read it as a motive 
case.162 But that hostility was inferred from the objectively unequal 
treatment of Phillips and the other bakers. It is a very short step to 
make that focus on objectively unequal treatment even more 
explicit, and to make objectively unequal treatment dispositive, 
whether or not the factfinder draws an inference of actual hostility. 
V. CONCLUSION—THE BIGGER PICTURE 
Either overruling Smith or enforcing a serious requirement of 
general applicability would lead to much better protection for 
religious liberty. And that would be a good thing not just for 
conscientiously objecting wedding vendors, but for a broad range 
of cases. Do not assume that this battle over legal doctrine is only 
about abortion, contraception, and same-sex weddings. The 
culture-war cases grow out of deep moral disagreement about 
matters relating to sex, and they get all the headlines, but they are 
not the typical cases. 
The typical cases about religious exemptions present far less 
controversial conflicts between pervasive government regulation 
and diverse religious practices.163 They mostly—not exclusively 
—involve the small religious minorities that Justice Scalia thought 
he was disadvantaging in Smith. Despite its deep division in 
Masterpiece and the contraception cases, the Supreme Court 
unanimously protected a Muslim prisoner’s right to grow a beard,164 
a church’s right not to be sued for discrimination by an employee 
in a position of religious leadership,165 another church’s right to use 
 
 161. See Laycock & Collis, supra note 58, at 17–19 (exploring ways in which exceptions 
can be fully intended and communicated outside the text of a statute or regulation). 
 162. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 84, at 146–54 (analyzing and criticizing 
Masterpiece as a motive case). 
 163. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 164–71 (2016) (collecting examples). 
 164. Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
 165. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
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a mildly hallucinogenic tea in its worship services,166 and a third 
church’s right to sacrifice small animals.167 Illustrative lower court 
cases have involved Sabbath observance,168 grooming rules169, 
Amish buggies and Mennonite tractors,170 unnecessary 
autopsies,171 churches feeding the homeless,172 and zoning rules 
that prevent religious groups from creating places of worship.173 
And then there is Mary Stinemetz, the Kansas woman who died 
for her faith, in America, in the twenty-first century. She was a 
Jehovah’s Witness, so she could not accept a blood transfusion, and 
she needed a liver transplant. Bloodless liver transplants were 
available in Omaha, and they were actually cheaper than any 
transplant hospital in Kansas. But Kansas Medicaid had a rule: we 
don’t pay for out-of-state medical care. She sued under the state 
constitution, and she eventually won,174 but by then it was too late. 
Her condition had deteriorated to the point that she was no longer 
medically eligible for a transplant. She died soon thereafter.175 If 
you support Employment Division v. Smith176 and oppose religious 
exemptions, your explanation has to address why Mary Stinemetz 
should not have gotten one. Smith led Kansas officials to believe 
that they never have to consider religious exemptions—that they 
 
 166. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 167. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 168. Filinovich v. Claar, No. 04 C 7189, 2006 WL 1994580 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2006) 
 169. See, e.g., EEOC v. Geo Grp. Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (Muslim veil); A.A. ex 
rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) (Native American 
long hair); Litzman v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 12 Civ. 4681, 2013 WL 6049066 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 
15, 2013) (Orthodox Jewish beard). 
 170. See, e.g., Gingerich v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 835 (Ky. 2012); Mitchell Cty. v. 
Zimmerman, 810 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2012); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990). 
 171. See, e.g., Stone v. Allen, No. 07-0681, 2007 WL 4209262 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 27, 2007); 
Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). Yang played a prominent role in the legislative 
hearings that led to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See, e.g., Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1992) (remarks of Rep. 
Edwards, chair of the subcommittee) (noting that William Yang’s testimony had provided 
“new insight into the importance of this legislation”). 
 172. Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City of Phila., No. 12-3159, 2012 WL 3235317 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 9, 2012); Abbott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 783 So.2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 173. See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-
Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1021 (2012) (collecting and analyzing cases). 
 174. Stinemetz v. Kan. Health Pol’y Auth., 252 P.3d 141 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011). 
 175. Brad Cooper, Jehovah’s Witness Who Needed Bloodless Transplant Dies, KANSAS CITY 
STAR, Oct. 25, 2012, http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article310218/Jehovahs-
Witness-who-needed-bloodless-transplant-dies.html [https://perma.cc/6CCN-7VU6]. 
    176.   494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
004.LAYCOCK_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  3:41 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
204 
didn’t have to talk to Mary Stinemetz or take her seriously. And 
they didn’t. 
As the case of Mary Stinemetz graphically illustrates, and as 
Jack Phillips’s surrender of nearly half his business illustrates less 
dramatically, religious liberty reduces human suffering. It reduces 
social conflict. It is one of America’s great contributions to the 
world. We should not let it slip away, either in legal wrangling or 
in a bitter culture war. And the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Masterpiece is an important step toward restoring federal 
constitutional protection for religious liberty. 
 
 
